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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a3(2)(a)(2001).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the Labor Commission erred in applying the plain language of Utah Code Ann.

§ 34A-2-413 (10)( 1997) that an award to an employee entitled to statutory permanent total disability
benefits for loss of both legs, is not subject to re-examination for a claim of employability by the
employer. A decision of the Utah Labor Commission based upon statutory construction is a legal
ruling, review of which is de novo. Esquivel v. Labor Commission of Utah, 2000 UT 66 (Utah
5/23/2000).
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
The determinative authority whether an employee is entitled to permanent total disability
benefits is Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-413(1997)(attached as Addendum D).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This petition seeks review of an order of the Utah Labor Commission denying the employer's
motion for review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Barbara Elicerio, ("ALJ") providing
continuing permanent total disability benefits. (Order Denying Motion for Review, attached as
Addendum C).
Course of Proceedings Below
The Petitioner below ("Stephens") was injured in an industrial accident on September 8,
1998, which resulted in the amputation of both legs just below the knee. (The facts are set forth in
4

the preliminary order of the ALJ, and the final order of the ALJ, attached as Addenda A and B,
respectively hereto. Since neither party takes issue with the facts as found, recourse to the record is
unnecessary, and the orders should be reviewed for correctness). Stephens filed an application for
benefits, claiming permanent total disability benefits under U.C. A. §34A-2-413(10). (All subsequent
references in this brief to "subsections" are to the various subsections of Section 413). Subsection
10(a) provides that "the loss . . . of both feet. . . constitutes total and permanent disability, to be
compensated according to this section" The following subsection, 10(b), provides that "A finding
of permanent total disability pursuant toSubsection (10)(a) is final". The ALJ found that Stephens
was entitled to permanent total disability benefits. The Appellant ("Employer") filed a motion for
review with the Utah Labor Commission, which was denied. The Employer then filed a Petition for
Review of the Labor Commission's order with this Court.
Statement of Facts
Stephens was injured in an industrial accident on September 8, 1998, resulting in the
amputation of both legs just below the knee. Stephens was contacted by a vocational rehabilitation
counselor provided by Employer. Shortly after, Stephens began taking college classes in computer
engineering, paid for by Employer. While Stephens was going to college, on September 28, 1999,
Employer decided it did not want to pay for Stephens education, and, instead, offered him a job
doing telephone work. Stephens decided he did not want to stop his education, and refused the job.
About one month later, Employer offered Stephens another job, as a dispatcher, which Stephens
again refused.
On February 1,2000, the ALJ made a preliminary ruling that Stephens would be entitled to
his statutory permanent total disability benefits, regardless of his employability. In retaliation,
5

Employer stopped paying for Stephens education, forcing Stephens to get funding from the State of
Utah.
A subsequent hearing was held on the issue of re-employability. At that hearing, the ALJ
found that "At best . . . .

Respondents [Employer] have identified one job that the petitioner

[Stephens] MAY be able to perform." The ALJ placed the word "may" in capitals, apparently to
make clear that Employer's proof failed to reach a preponderance of the evidence. She further
characterized Employer's evidence as "ambiguous", and noted that Employer failed to offer any
evidence that the dispatch position it offered Stephens was "generally available" in the work force.
The ALJ found that Subsection 10 permanent total disability cases are not subject to the reemployment provisions of Subsection 7. On a motion for review, the Utah Labor Commission
agreed, and ordered the Employer to continue paying permanent total disability benefits to Stephens.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
It is illogical to assume that the Legislature intended to exempt Subsection 10 applicants from
showing an initial showing of lack of employability, only to allow the employer to assert
employability by way of a post-award review. Further, the Legislature clearly disallowed employers
from re-examining statutory permanent total disability awards in Subsection 11. Therefore, the
Legislature has made clear that statutory permanent total disability awards be irrevocable.
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE LEGISLATURE SPECIFICALLY EXEMPTED SUBSECTION 10
DISABILITY CASES FROM RE-EXAMINATION FOR EMPLOYABILITY
The Legislature provided in Subsection 11 that an employer may not re-examine a Subsection
10 disability case for re-employment:
6

An insurer or self-insured employer may periodically re-examine a permanent total
disability claim, except those based upon Subsection (10),... to determine whether
the worker remains permanently totally disabled.
U.C.A. §34A-2-414(ll)(a)(1997).
The statutory language is plain and unambiguous. The courts will construe a statute in a way
to give effect to all provisions of the statute. Employers Reinsurance Fund v. Ind. Comm. Of Utah,
856 P.2d 648 (Utah App. 1993)("We have a fundamental duty to give effect, if possible, to every
word in the statute [citation omitted]").If re-examination of Subsection 10 cases for employability
is allowed, then Subsection 11 is made meaningless.
The reasoning for Subsection 11(a) is clear. A statutory permanent total disability claim is
based upon permanent loss of limbs or eyes. No re-examination is going to change the fact that a
Subsection 10 claimant has lost use of limbs or eyes. In Stephens case, for instance, no reexamination is ever going to find that he has his amputated legs back. No rehabilitation is going to
restore his missing feet.
Alternatively, Employer attempts to divorce Subsection 11 from Subsection 7(b), and argue
that while the employer may not re-examine the Subsection 10 claim under Subsection 7(a)(ii), it
can provide a job instead of benefits. The problem with this attempted divorce is that a Subsection
11 re-examination is to determine if the worker is still permanently totally disabled under Subsection
7 in its entirety. Subsection 11 does not limit the scope of a re-examination to just Subsection
7(a)(ii). If an employer can re-examine under Subsection 7 at all, and it can, it can re-examine under
the whole Subsection.
To accept Employer's argument would lead to an intolerable result. The practical effect of
this argument would be to turn the employee into an permanently indentured servant of the employer.
7

If a statutory permanent total disability claimant were forced to accept a job with an employer instead
of receiving benefits, the worker would be forever tethered to that employer. The employer cannot
completely avoid its obligation by showing the employer is capable of "regular, steady work", as that
would violate Subsection 11(a). So instead, the employer forces the worker into life-long servitude,
at pain of losing benefits if the worker refuses the job with the employer.
POINT TWO
THE LEGISLATURE DID NOT INTEND TO RELIEVE A SUBSECTION 10
APPLICANT FROM MAKING A SHOWING OF LACK OF EMPLOYABILITY, ONLY
TO ADD IT BACK IN AFTER THE AWARD BY WAY OF RE-EXAMINATION
Employer admits that a Subsection 10 applicant need not make an initial showing of
unemployability. Employer admits that an injured worker suffering the listed injuries is entitled to
an initial award of permanent total disability benefits. However, Employer's theory is that the
employer can bring this issue through the back door after the award is made, by way of a showing
of re-employability. Thus, Employer argues that the Subsection 10 employee need not make any
showing of inability to perform "regular, steady work" to initially get an award, but immediately
must avoid that same showing in order to maintain the award. This is illogical; if the Legislature
intended to exempt the Subsection 10 employee in thefirstplace, it surely intended to exempt that
employee after the award.
POINT THREE
IT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE WORKERS COMPENSATION
SCHEME TO COMPENSATE ACCORDING TO INJURY WITHOUT
REGARD TO FUTURE EMPLOYABILITY
To exempt Subsection 10 claimants from any reduction in award is consistent with the
overall scheme of employee compensation for industrial injury. In the non-total disability case, the
8

worker receives an award based upon permanent partial impairment, without regard to actual loss
of employability. For example, a loss of a finger might result in a complete loss of employability to
a violinist, but no loss of employability to a lawyer or judge. The compensation is not tied to loss of
income, but is a set amount based upon the relative severity of the injury, as expressed in percentage
of impairment. If the employee never loses a day of work due to the permanent partial disability
injury, the same compensation is awarded. The general approach is to compensate according to
impairment, i.e. loss of use, without regard to any question of employability. The only exception to
an impairment based award is Subsection (1), granting compensation for permanent total disability.
Subsection (1) requires a detailed showing of inability to work, without regard to a specific level of
injury. A Subsection 10 case is most like a permanent partial disability case, because the award is
based on the severity of injury without regard to loss of ability to work. Thus, It is logically
consistent to allow the employer to show rehabilitation, or to offer a part-time job in Subsection (1)
cases, but not in Subsection (10) cases.
This is the sad explanation that attorneys representing injured workers must repeatedly give.
Workers call, explaining that they got a 5% impairment for a back injury, that completely disables
them from all but minimum wage sedentary work. The loss of earning capacity may be enormous,
but unless there is a basis for claiming permanent total disability, the worker is only compensated
for that impairment, not the loss of earnings.
POINT FOUR
THE SUBSECTION 11 EXEMPTION FROM REVIEW IS A SPECIFIC
STATUTE WHICH CONTROLS OVER A GENERAL STATUTE
ALLOWING RE-EXAMINATION
The Labor Commission denied the Employer's motion for review on the grounds that the
9

statutory permanent total disability is a specific statute, and the re-examination provisions of
Subsection 7 are a general statute. The Labor Commission reasoned that since a specific statute
governs over a more general statute, the provisions of Subsection 10 prevail. Craftsman Builder's
Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194,1999 UT 18, 1[54(1999)("A settled rule of statutory
construction .. . provides that a more specific statute governs instead of a more general statute").
The relevant general category is that of all permanently, totally disabled workers. The specific
subset of that general class is those workers who are entitled to permanent, total disability due to loss
of two limbs or eyes. Thus, Subsection 10 targets a specific and smaller class of the larger group of
permanently disabled workers. Since the specific provisions of Subsection 10 mandate that its award
is final, the general re-employment or re-examination provisions of Subsection 7 do not apply at all.
The Labor Commission quoted Larson's Workers Compensation Law, §83.08 as follows:
Special statutory provisions may supersede the general principles controlling
the relation between medical and wage loss factors in determining total disability.
The commonest example of this type of statute is the familiar provision that certain
combinations of losses of members shall be presumed to constitute total disability.
The presumption may be prima facie or conclusive. A typical statute applies the
presumption to loss or loss of use of both hands, both arms, both legs, both feet, both
eyes, or any two of these.. .Under such a statute, depending on its wording, evidence
of actual earnings would be either entirely immaterial, or would have to be
extremenly convincing to overcome the presumption.
The Commission noted that Utah's statute falls into the first category, where evidence of actual
earnings is immaterial, and concluded that Stephens was entitled to permanent total disability
benefits regardless of return to work.
The Commission's position makes sense. As Point Two argues, the award of statutory
permanent total disability benefits under Subsection 10 is similar to an award of partial disability
benefits, in that it is awarded without regard to loss of earnings or earning ability. It is not logical
10

to subject such an award to the provisions of Subsection 7 regarding return to work.
POINT FIVE
THE EMPLOYER FAILED TO SHOW THAT STEPHENS WAS ABLE
TO RETURN TO REGULAR, STEADY WORK
The Employer has the burden under Subsection 11 of showing that Stephens was no longer
disabled, and was capable of "regular, steady work". The ALJ found that Employer failed to present
any evidence that the dispatch job it offered Stephens was generally available in the workplace. The
ALJ stated that "at best" the Employer identified one job that Stephens may be able to do. The ALJ
even put the word "may" in capital letters to indicate the lack of persuasiveness of the Employer's
evidence.
The ALJ contemplated a remand for further evidence if Stephens were to be subject to a reexamination under Subsection 7. However, it is Stephens' position that the Employer failed to carry
its burden of proof at the hearing, it should accept the consequence, through an outright affirmance
by this Court, without a remand for further evidence.
CONCLUSION
The Employer is faced with paying for a statutory permanent total disability claim to
Stephens. Its initial plan was apparently to pay for Stephens to go to college, and then to tell him to
get a job, and cut off his benefits. Once Stephens applied for a ruling on this issue, and won,
Employer retaliated by cutting off funding for his schooling. Employer then offered Stephens a job
as a dispatcher, again in an effort to get out of paying a Subsection 10 disability claim.
The problem with Employer's efforts is that a Subsection 10 disability claim, by statute, is
final, and not subject to review under Subsection 11, to allow a showing of employability under
Subsection 7. The statute is clear, and Employer's liability is clear. To adopt Employer's argument
11

would turn Stephens into an indentured servant of Employer for the rest of his work life, allowing
it to avoid paying disability benefits so long as it agreed to make up a job for Stephens. The
Legislature gave no indication that it intended to turn Subsection 10 into a mandatory employment
act for permanently injured workers. The petition for review should be denied, and the decision of
the Utah Labor Commission upheld.
DATED this 12th day of September, 2001.

Daniel F. Bertch
Attorney for Appellee/Petitioner Stephens

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 12th day of September, 2001,1 served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing APPELLEES' BRIEF upon the following, by depositing copies thereof in the United
States mails, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:

Allen Hennebold
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615
Theodore E. Kanell
Robert C. Olsen
PLANT WALLACE CHRISTENSEN & KANELL
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
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ADDENDUM A
Preliminary Conclusions of Law and Order - February 1,2000

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
Case No. 99648

KYLE STEPHENS,
Petitioner,

PRELIMINARY
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
INTERMOUNTAIN SLURRY SEAL/
CNA INSURANCE,

AND ORDER
*

Respondents.
*

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

*

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

HEARING:

Room 334, Labor Commission, 160 East 300 South, Salt
Lake City, Utah, on November 29, 1999 at 11:00 o'clock
a.m. Said hearing was pursuant to Order and Notice of
the Commission.

BEFORE:

Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The petitioner
Attorney.

was represented

by

Kevin K. Robson,

The respondents were represented by Theodore Kanell,
Attorney.

This case involves a claim for permanent total disability
benefits related to a September 8, 1998 industrial injury.
It is
uncontested that the petitioner had both legs amputated below the knee,
after a heavy equipment roller ran over his legs, at work, on September
8, 1998.
It is also uncontested that the applicable permanent total
disability benefits statute, U.C.A 34A-2-413(10), requires a final
finding of permanent total disability in this case, due to the
petitioner's loss of both feet and/or legs.
The issue that is in
dispute is whether or not another section of the applicable statute,
U.C.A. 34A-2-413(7), allows for cessation of the permanent total
disability benefits, due to the petitioner's alleged current ability to
return to regular steady work. The petitioner argues that, legally, the
provision allowing cessation of benefits, due to ability to return to
regular steady work, does not apply to "statutory"(i.e. specifically
designated in subsection
(10) of the statute) permanent total
disabilities, like the petitioner's. In addition, the petitioner argues
that, even if that provision does apply to the petitioner's case, he is
not capable of returning to "regular steady" work, sufficient to provide
for his needs. The respondents argue that the cessation provision of
the statute applies to all cases of permanent total disability and that
this is consistent with the main purpose of the revised statute, which
encourages rehabilitation and return to work.

PRELIMINARY ORDER
R.E: KYLE STEPHENS
PAGE 2

At the hearing, the ALJ did not take testimony. It was unclear
if both parties were ready to present evidence on the disputed factual
issue regarding the petitioner's ability to return to work and thus the
ALJ indicated that she would reschedule to allow for a hearing aimed at
presentation of evidence on this reemployment/rehabilitation issue. The
ALJ found that the matter was at least ready for an order awarding
permanent total disability benefits, since the statute requires a final
order of permanent total disability, for the type of severe injury
incurred by the petitioner. The ALJ finds that it is also appropriate
to make a preliminary ruling on the issue of whether subsection (7), of
the applicable statute, applies to subsection (10) permanent total
disabilities.
The parties made their arguments at hearing, on this
issue, and the ALJ feels she understands the arguments asserted by both
parties, so that a ruling can be made now.
The ALJ will make it a
preliminary ruling at this time. Because this issue is one of first
impression and involves a threshold right-to-compensation dispute, the
ALJ wants to make sure that her final ruling is made based on
consideration of all the possible arguments. To allow for this, the ALJ
will make a preliminary ruling now, but will reconsider this ruling at
the time of the next hearing, if the parties present argument, at that
time, that the ALJ has not considered in this order.

ARGUMENT OF THE PETITIONER:
The petitioner argues that subsection (10) makes it clear that
the legislature intended that the severe loss of several limbs was to
be compensated, without requiring the petitioner to establish the list
of facts other individuals claiming permanent total disability need to
establish. The petitioner argues that the legislature made a point of
indicating that the finding of permanent total disability in these cases
was "final" or not subject to reconsideration (subsection (10) (b) ) . In
fact, the petitioner points out that the legislature went on to
emphasize the finality of the finding in these cases, by indicating
that the reexamination privileges (referring to the privileges granted
employers/carriers to later challenge an award of permanent total
disability benefits) , allowed in other permanent total disability cases,
are not allowed in "statutory" (i.e. subsection (10)) cases. U.C.A.
34A-2-413(11)(a).
The petitioner argues that it makes no sense to
disallow reexamination in statutory permanent total disability cases,
if the employer can simply stop paying benefits, because it believes the
petitioner is capable of returning to work. Considering the consistency
in the statute, of exempting statutory permanent uonai cases from zhe
challenges and hurdles provided for in other cases of permanent total
disability, the petitioner argues that it is illogical and inconsistent
to suggest that the "final" award of benefits can simply be set aside,
if the petitioner is deemed capable of returning to work.

PRELIMINARY ORDER
RE: KYLE STEPHENS
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ARGUMENT OF THE RESPONDENTS:
The respondents argue that the legislature clearly wanted to
encourage reemployment when they revised the prior permanent total
disability statute. The respondents argue that this was accomplished
in the revised statute, by the trade-off of requiring employers to pay
the full life-time award in permanent total disability cases, without
assistance from the Employers Reinsurance Fund, but allowing employers
to arrange for reemployment or rehabilitation of injured employees, so
as to mitigate the cost of paying life-time benefits. The respondents
argue that, to accomplish this trade-off of additional burden for the
employer, subject to limitations, it is necessary to allow the
employer/carrier to discontinue benefits, once the injured employee can
return to work. With respect to statutory permanent total cases, the
respondents argue that the legislature wanted to exempt these cases only
from the requirement of establishing the initial list of elements and
not from the requirement of inability to perform work. The respondents
argue that the legislature intended that employers/carriers would be
relieved of paying benefits in all cases where the injured employee was
capable of returning to work, including statutory cases.
The
respondents argue that this intention is manifested in subsection (7)
where it is stated that, after a final order awarding permanent total
disability benefits, those benefits cease when the employee is capable
of returning to work, with no special exemption specified for statutory,
subsection (10), cases.

PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The ALJ preliminarily finds that "statutory," or subsection
(10), permanent total disability cases are not, as a matter of law,
subject to the subsection (7) (b) cut-off of benefits, when they are
capable of return to regular steady work. There are several reasons why
the ALJ finds, this to be the appropriate interpretation of the statutory
language (absent any specific exemption stated in (7)(b) itself).
1.

The ALJ finds that, if the legislature had
intended
that
benefits
for
"statutory"
permanent total disability cases could be cut
off, as with other cases, there would be no
need to
create a special category for these
cases, as the legislature did in subsection
(10).

The respondents argue that the legislature wanted
subsection (10) cases to be exempt only from the
initial permanent total disability provisions in

PRELIMINARY ORDER
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subsection (1) (c) of the statute, but not from the cutoff provisions of subsection (7) (a) (ii) . The ALJ finds
this argument illogical. Using this interpretation of
the statute, for purposes of obtaining an initial award
of benefits, a subsection (10) case would be exempted
from showing inability to perform other work than had
been performed prior to injury.
However, the
subsection (10) case would then would need to establish
the inability to work after an award of permanent total
disability benefits, if the employer/carrier challenged
the award under the subsection (7)(a)(ii) provisions.
It does not seem logical to the ALJ that the
legislature would want to exempt subsection (10) cases
from a. requirement, only to place that burden back on
the subsection (10) case, immediately after an award
was made. It seems much more logical to presume that
the legislature simply wanted subsection (10) cases to
get benefits, without the need to ever establish total
inability to work.
To suggest that subsection (10)
cases need to show inability to perform other work,
either before or after an award, results in a
conclusion that subsection (10) cases simply need to
show what all other claimants need to establish.
If
this is the case, then there is no need for the
subsection
(10) special designation for loss of
multiple limbs. The ALJ cannot accept that subsection
(10) was added to the statute for no reason. Rather it
seems more logical that the legislature intended some
meaningful exemptions for those with extremely severe
losses, i.e. exemption from the normal requirement of
showing inability to perform all kinds of work.

2.

Since the legislature disallows the carrier to
"reexamine"
statutory
permanent
total
disability awards, it appears the legislature
intended that the awards be irrevocable.

Subsection (11) (a) specifies that the reexamination
rights, allowed to employers/carriers after an award of
permanent total disability benefits is made, are not
available to employer/carriers in subsection (10)
cases. Since the legislature intended that there be no
post-order investigation of employability in subsection
(10) cases, it appears logical to presume that the
legislature felt employability was irrelevant in
subsection
(10) cases. If the legislature wanted
subsection (10) cases to be subject to the same
subsection (7) cessation of benefits for employability

PRELIMINARY ORDER
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that other cases are subject to (as argued by the
respondents), then it would seem illogical to disallow
reexamination in subsection (10) cases.
The more
consistent interpretation of the disallowance of
reexamination for subsection (10) cases, is that the
legislature intended employability to be a non-issue
for subsection (10) cases, both before an award, as
noted above, and after award, as noted in subsection
(11) (a) .
For the consistency reasons stated above, the ALJ preliminarily finds
that the award of permanent total disability benefits made in this order
is not revocable under subsection (7) (a) (ii) of the statute. This
finding/conclusion will become final at the time of the ALJ's final
ruling/order in this case, unless revised or rescinded in the final
ruling/order. The matter will be rescheduled for a hearing on the
factual issue of the petitioner's current ability to return to regular
steady work. This hearing is intended to resolve all factual issues
that may be relevant to any appeal or request for review on a final
award of permanent total disability benefits.
BENEFITS DUE:
Because of this preliminary ruling, or alternatively because of
the subsistence benefits provision in U.C.A. 34A-2-413(6)(b), the
respondents should continue paying the petitioner at the permanent total
disability rate, until further order of the Commission indicating
otherwise. It is presumed that the respondents have not discontinued
paying benefits and that the respondents have been paying the benefits
at the rate of at least the maximum permanent total disability of
$414.00 per week. Benefits should continue at the $414.00/week rate.
ATTORNEY FEES:
Unless this award is rescinded or adjusted, the petitioner's
attorney is entitled to the maximum fee award ($9,100.00), to be
deducted from the award to the petitioner. Presumably, the respondents
have never discontinued paying benefits, so there is no accrued award
out of which an attorney fee award can be deducted. If this presumption
is incorrect, the parties should notify the ALJ immediately. As a
result of the absence of an accrued amount due the petitioner, the only
way to pay the attorney is by a deduction or withholding from the ongoing weekly benefits. The petitioner's attorney should discuss the
withholding with the petitioner to determine what amount he and the
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attorney agree upon can be deducted from each payment for purpose of the
fee.
The attorney should then notify the ALJ regarding the amount
agreed upon (no more than 20% of the weekly payments, but less can be
agreed upon). The ALJ will do a supplemental order specifying how the
attorneys fee will be handled or will include a provision in the final
order specifying how the attorney fee should be paid. If the attorney
or the petitioner have questions or concerns regarding the attorney fee
award, they can contact the ALJ at the Commission.

ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the respondents, Intermountain
Slurry/CNA Insurance, pay the petitioner, Kyle Stephens, permanent total
disability benefits at the rate of $414.00 per week, beginning on date
of injury, September 8, 1998, and continuing until the death of the
petitioner or until further order of the Commission altering the award
herein. The benefits should be paid less the deduction for attorney
fees, the amount of which shall be specified in a later supplemental
order or in the final order in this matter.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondents pay Kevin Robson,
attorney for the petitioner, the sum of $9,100.00, plus the percentage
of interest that is appropriate per R602-2-4, for services rendered in
this matter. This amount is to be deducted from the aforesaid award to
the petitioner, in a periodic deduction, the amount of which deduction
is to be specified in an order to be issued in the future. The attorney
fees are to be remitted directly to the office of Kevin Robson.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case be rescheduled for further
hearing on the issue of the petitioner' s current employability, with the
parties receiving hearing notices indicating the date and time of the
rescheduled hearing.

DATED this 1 day of February, 2000.

Barbara Elicerio
Administrative Law Judge
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review
with the Adjudication Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion
for Review must set forth the specific basis for review and must be
received by the Commission within 30 days form the date THE FINAL
DECISION IN THIS CASE is signed. Other parties may then submit their
Responses to the Motion for Review within 20 days of the date of the
Motion for Review.
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor
Commission conduct the foregoing review. Such request must be included
in the party's Motion for Review or its Response.
If none of the
parties specifically requests review by the Appeals Board, the review
will be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the Jj day of i t ID
2000, I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER, in the case of
Kyle Stephens v. Intermountain Slurry Seal / CNA Insurance. (Case No. 99648) to the following
parties:

POSTAGE PREPAID:
KYLE STEPHENS
408 East 100 North #1
Logan, UT 84321
KEVIN K. ROBSON, ATTY
5296 South Commerce Drive #100
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
THEODORE E. KANELL, ATTY
ROBERT C. OLSEN, ATTY
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL
136 East South Temple #1700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1131

Kathy Houskeeper
H:\JU1X";E\kHOUSKEE\BE\.slcplKns IK

ADDENDUM B
Final Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order - November 2, 2000

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
Case No. 99648

KYLE STEPHENS,
Petitioner,

FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
INTERMOUNTAIN SLURRY SEAL/
CNA INSURANCE,

AND ORDER

Respondents.
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

*

•

•

•

2 N D HEARING:

Room 334, Labor Commission, 160 East 300 South, Salt
Lake City, Utah, on June 8, 2000at 3:00o'clock p.m.
Said hearing was pursuant to Order and Notice of the
Commission.

BEFORE:

Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The petitioner
Attorney.

was

represented

by

Kevin

Robson,

The respondents were represented by Theodore Kanell,
Attorney.
PROCEDURAL STATUS OF LITIGATION:
On February 1, 2000, the ALJ issued Preliminary Conclusions of
Law and Order in the above-captioned matter, concluding that the
petitioner was entitled to payment of permanent total disability
benefits, regardless of what his capacity was for returning to work.
Although the ALJ allowed for additional legal argument on that statutory
construction issue, relating to the award of permanent total disability
benefits, the parties presented no further argument on that legal issue.
A second hearing was held as indicated above, to address the factual
issues surrounding the petitioner's ability to return to work. This
Order addresses the facts related to the petitioner's ability to return
to work currently and affirms the ALJ's preliminary analysis and ruling
on the legal issue (addressed in the prior order).
FINDINGS OF FACT:
Soon after the petitioner's September 8, 1998 industrial injury,
in which he lost both legs just below the knee, the respondents had a
vocational rehabilitation counselor/analyst review the petitioner's work
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background and skills. The counselor/analyst issued a report, dated
October 12, 1998, Exhibit D-4, which concludes that the petitioner had
potential for returning to .work with his prior employer, Granite
Construction/Concrete Products and also had transferable skills that
would allow him to perform work in a number of occupations. Apparently,
sometime in 1999, the petitioner began going to college, taking courses
in computer electronj.cs, with the respondents funding this endeavor.
The respondents indicated that they decided to pay for this
rehabilitative effort, because they presumed that they would be relieved
of the payment of permanent total disability benefits, once the
petitioner was rehabilitated and returned to work. It is unclear why
the respondents did not offer work or identify work for the petitioner
instead.

On September 28, 1999, the respondents offered the petitioner
a job with his prior employer (Granite Construction, aka Concrete
Products).
This job involved primarily telephone work, per the job
description submitted at hearing (Exhibit D-2). The salary level for
the job is not indicated on the exhibit. About a month later, a second
position was offered to the petitioner.
This second position was a
dispatcher position, paying $2,000.00 per month (Exhibit D-3). It
appears undisputed that the position could be performed from a
wheelchair.
The position is apparently located in Ogden and would
require the petitioner to travel from his home in Logan to Ogden each
day. The petitioner indicated, at hearing, that his disability would
not necessarily prevent him from making the somewhat lengthy commute.
The petitioner stated that he wants to keep his residence in Logan,
where his extended family resides, as this family has been supportive
and helpful in his recovery from the work injury.
The petitioner's
salary in his prior position, as of the date of injury, per the
application for hearing, was approximately $3,200.00 per month
($18.00/hour x 22 days x 8 hours/day). The petitioner stated that he
was in school when the jobs were offered and he wanted to complete his
schooling.

After the ALJ issued her order on February 1, 2000, the
respondents discontinued payment on the petitioner's college courses.
The respondents indicated at hearing that, since the ALJ's order
indicated that the respondents would be liable for permanent total
disability benefits for life, the respondents no longer had any
motivation for rehabilitating the petitioner.
The petitioner was
disappointed and confused by this discontinuance of payment of his
college, as the respondents initially encouraged him to pursue the
education.
Previously, the petitioner had been attending college
classes 2 hours per day, 5 days per week, with about 3-4 hours study
time per day,.
The petitioner took a bus to and from his classes.
Although he has a van with hand controls in it, so that he can drive
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himself, the petitioner stated that the van does not run real well and
probably needs a new engine, which he cannot afford. He stated that he
was able to ambulate using a wheelchair, his prosthetic devices, or
crutches. The petitioner wants to continue with his courses and thus
he has arranged for payment of his education through the Division of
Rehabilitation Services.
The petitioner stated that he has been trying to manage without
the wheelchair, as much as possible, using his prosthetic devices, but
has been having problems with getting the devices to fit. He stated
that his legs continue to shrink, causing gaps between his legs and the
prosthetic devices.
The gaps cause blisters.
In addition, the
petitioner stated he has begun to see a physician for severe back pain
that is caused by use of the prostheses. The petitioner indicated that
considering all the problems he has been having with the prosthetic
devices, in order to return to work, he would need to rely exclusively
on the wheelchair. He stated he would also need to be gone for a good
portion of every work day, because he is currently getting physical
therapy for 1-2 hours per day.
It is unclear if this would be
accommodated with paid leave time.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The respondents argue that the petitioner is capable of
returning to regular steady work and thus his permanent total disability
benefits cease, as indicated in U.C.A. 34A-2-413 (7)(a)(ii).
As
indicated in the ALJ's prior order, the ALJ concludes that this
provision for cessation of benefits does not apply to subsection (10)
cases, involving loss of both limbs. If this analysis is incorrect, and
the petitioner's benefits are subject to cessation per subsection
(7) (a) (ii), the ALJ finds that the evidence of the petitioner's ability
to return to ''regular, steady work" is somewhat inconclusive at this
point. At best, the ALJ finds that the respondents have identified one
job that the petitioner MAY be able to perform.
The ALJ has the
following questions regarding whether the petitioner can perform this
job:
1.

Considering the petitioner's recent development
of back pain, can the petitioner manage the
commute from Logan to Ogden on a daily basis
and can the petitioner manage confinement to a
wheelchair?
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How much accommodation in pay and leave will
the respondents offer, to allow for the
petitioner's treatment needs (i.e. physical
therapy and physician appointments, etc.)?
Is 2/3 of his prior income sufficient to meet
the
petitioner's
income
requirements,
considering financial needs he will have that
will not be covered by workers compensation
insurance (for example: the cost of a new
vehicle, so that he can make the commute)?

In addition to the foregoing concerns about the petitioner's ability to
perform the job in question, the ALJ has concerns regarding whether one
job position opening that the petitioner might be able to perform
translates to capacity to return to "regular, steady work."
The
respondents have alleged that the dispatcher position is "generally
available" in the work force. This may or may not be true (no evidence
was actually submitted with respect to the general availability of these
positions),
especially
depending
on
the
number
and
type
of
accommodations that may be necessary to address the petitioner's
disability and complicating factors, such as back pain.

Considering the above-noted concerns, the ALJ finds that if the
Commission, or other appellate body, should determine that the
petitioner's benefits are subject to cessation per subsection (7), as
the respondents have argued, the matter should be remanded for further
consideration of the petitioner's ability to perform "regular, steady
work," at the point in the future, when this case may be finally
decided.

BENEFITS DUE:
Because the ALJ has determined that the petitioner is due
benefits, regardless of his ability to perform regular steady work, the
ALJ will confirm the award of benefits made in the earlier order below.
Attorney Robson has indicated that he and the petitioner have decided
that the full amount of benefits shall go to the petitioner until 18
months following August 2000 (February 2002).
After that, the
respondents should pay the petitioner his compensation rate ($414.00 per
week) less 20% ($82.80 per week), or $331.20 per week, for 110 weeks
($82.80/week x 110 weeks = $9,100.00), or until approximately March
2004, thereafter returning to full benefit payment of $414.00 per week.
Attorney Robson can arrange for a lump sum advance payment of his
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attorney fees (most likely involving a discount to present value) with
the carrier, if that is mutually agreeable to the parties. As long as
this is arranged per agreement, the ALJ will not need to approve the
particulars of this advance payment.
ORDER:

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the respondents, Intermountain
Slurry(aka Granite Construction and Concrete Products)/CNA Insurance,
pay the petitioner, Kyle Stephens, permanent total disability benefits
at the rate of $414.00 per week, beginning on date of injury, September
8, 1998, and continuing until February 2002. Thereafter, to account for
the attorney fee award below, the respondents shall pay the benefits at
the rate of $331.20 for 110 weeks or until approximately March 2004.
From March 2004 forward the benefit rate shall be returned to $414.00
until the death of the petitioner or until further order of the
Commission altering the award herein.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondents pay Kevin Robson,
attorney for the petitioner, the sum of $9,100.00, plus the percentage
of interest that is appropriate per R602-2-4, for services rendered in
this matter. This amount is to be deducted from the aforesaid award to
the petitioner, in a periodic deduction, as indicated in the preceding
order paragraph. The attorney fees are to be remitted directly to the
office of Kevin Robson.

DATED this 2 day of November, 2000.

Bartfara Elicerio
Administrative Law Judge
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review
with the Adjudication Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion
for Review must set forth the specific basis for review and must be
received by the Commission within 30 days form the date this decision
is signed. Other parties may then submit their Responses to the Motion
for Review within 20 days of the date of the Motion for Review.
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor
Commission conduct the foregoing review. Such request must be included
in the party's Motion for Review or its Response.
If none of the
parties specifically requests review by the Appeals Board, the review
will be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 6TH day of November, 2000,1 mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Settlement of Disputed Claim for Permanent Total Disability Benefits & Order
for Approval, in the case of Kyle Stephens v. Intermountain Slurry Seal and CNA Ins.. (Case No.
99648) to the following parties:
POSTAGE PREPAID:

KYLE STEPHENS
408 East 100 North, #1
Logan, UT 84321
THEODORE E. KANELL, ESQ.
ROBERT C. OLSEN, ESQ.
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN &
KANELL
136 East South Temple, Ste. 1700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
KEVIN K. ROBSON, ESQ.
5296 South Commerce Dr #100
Salt Lake City, UT 84107

Vilma Mosier
HUUDGEWMOSIERVCertificate

ADDENDUM C
Order Denying Motion for Review - February 28, 2001

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
KYLE STEPHENS,
Applicant,

*
*
*

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

*

Case No. 99-0648

INTERMOUNTAIN SLURRY SEAL
and CNA INSURANCE,
Defendants.

Intermountain Slurry Seal and its workers compensation insurance carrier, CNA Insurance
(jointly referred to as "Intermountain") ask the Utah Labor Commission to review the Administrative
Law Judge's award of benefits to Kyle Stephens under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the
Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann.).
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M.
ISSUE PRESENTED
Pursuant to §34A-2-413(10) of the Act, is Mr. Stephens entitled to continuing permanent
total disability compensation?
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Commission adopts the findings of fact set forth in the decision of the ALJ. The facts
material to the issue now before the Commission may be summarized as follows. On September 8,
1998, while working for Intermountain, Mr. Stephens was run over by a heavy equipmentrroller,
resulting in amputation of both legs below the knees. Mr. Stephens received compensation for his
injuries pursuant to §34A-2-413(10) of the Act, which provides that loss of any two body members
constitutes a permanent total disability.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
Section 34A-2413(10) of the Act provides:
(a) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands, both arms, both
feet, both legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such body members constitutes
total and permanent disability, to be compensation according to this section.
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(b) A finding of permanent total disability pursuant to Subsection 10(a) is final.
The foregoing provision has long been a part of Utah's workers' compensation system. It
has consistently been interpreted and applied as creating a conclusive presumption of permanent total
disability. Such a provision is relatively common among the various states' workers' compensation
statutes. As noted in Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, §83.08:
Special statutory provisions may supersede the general principles controlling
the relation between medical and wage loss factors in determining total disability.
The commonest example of this type of statute is the familiar provision that certain
combinations of losses of members shall be presumed to constitute total disability.
The presumption may be prima facie or conclusive. A typical statute applies the
presumption to loss or loss of use of both hands, both arms, both legs, both feet, both
eyes, or any two of these....
Under such a statute, depending on its wording, evidence of actual earnings
would either be entirely immaterial, or would have to be extremely convincing to
overcome the presumption.
As previously noted, Utah's statute falls in the former category, where evidence of actual
earnings is immaterial. Consequently, Mr. Stephens is entitled to continuing permanent total
disability compensation.1
ORDER
The Commission affirms the decision of the ALJ and denies Intermountain's motion for
review. It is so ordered.
Dated this o$

day of February, 2001.

R. tee Ellertson
Utah Labor Commissioner
IMPORTANT! NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS FOLLOWS ON NEXT PAGE.

This does not mean that the parties cannot, by mutual agreement and with the approval
of the Commission, enter into some other arrangement that commutes Mr. Stephens' right
to continuing permanent total disability compensation in exchange for vocational training or
some other reemployment plan.
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order.
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days
of the date of this order.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Review in the matter of Kyle
Stephens, Case No. 99-0648, was mailed first class postage prepaid this 2fi day of February, 2001,
to the following:
KYLE STEPHENS
408E100N#1
LOGAN UT 84321
INTERMOUNTAIN SLURRY SEAL
1000 N WARM SPRINGS RD
P O BOX 30429
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84130
CNA INSURANCE
P O BOX 17369
DENVER CO 80217-0369
KEVIN K ROBSON
BERTCH ROBSON ATTORNEYS
1996 E 6400 S
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84121
THEODORE E KANELL
PLANT WALLACE CHRISTENSEN & KANELL
136 E SOUTH TEMPLE #1700
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111

Sara Jensc
Support Specialist
Utah Labor Commission
Orders\99-0648
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(B) At interphalangeal joint
(iv) Index
finger
(A) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with
section of metacarpal bone
(B) At proximal interphalangeal joint ....
(C) At distal interphalangeal joint
(v) Middle
finger
(A) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with
section of metacarpal bone
(B) At proximal interphalangeal joint . . . .
(C) At distal interphalangeal joint
(vi) Ring
finger
"

50
re42
34
18
re34
27
15

(A) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal bone
17
(B) At proximal interphalangeal joint . . . . 13
(C) At distal interphalangeal joint
8
(vu) Little
finger
(A) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal bone
8
(B) At proximal interphalangeal joint
6
(C) At distal interphalangeal joint
4
(b) Lower extremity
(i) Leg
(A) Hemipelvectomy (leg. hip and pelvis)
156
(B) Leg at hip joint or three inches or less
below tuberosity of ischium
125
(C) Leg above knee with functional stump, at
knee joint or Gritti-Stokes amputation or below
knee with short stump (three inches or less below
intercondylar notch)
112
(D) Leg below knee with functional stump . . .
88
(ii) Foot
(A) Foot at ankle
88
(B) Foot partial amputation (Chopart's) .. 66
(C) Foot midmetatarsal amputation
44
(iii) Toes
(A) Great toe
(D With resection of metatarsal bone . 26
(II) At metatarsophalangeal joint . . . 16
(III) At interphalangeal joint
12
(B) Lesser toe (2nd
5th)
(I) With resection of metatarsal bone . 4
(II) At metatarsophalangeal joint
3
, TTT , A,
,.,
u i
i • • 4.
(III)
At proximal interphalangeal joint . .
n
/•nr^ AX J- x i • .
u I
i • • x
-i
(IV) At distal interphalangeal loint . . . 1
T i
i • • x
/nt.
A11 A
A
A x
(C) All toes at metatarsophalangeal joints . . .
,.
Miscellaneous
120
» 2ne , e ?f J e n u c l r e a t l o n
(B) Total blindness of one eye
100
. ( C ) Total loss of binaural hearing
109
(5) Permanent and complete loss of use shall be deemed
equivalent to loss of the member. Partial loss or partial loss of
use shall be a percentage of the complete loss or loss of use of
the member. This Subsection (5) does not apply to the items
listed in Subsection (4)(b)(iv).
(6) (a) For any permanent impairment caused by an industrial accident that is not otherwise provided for in the
schedule of losses ^ in this section, permanent partial
disability compensation shall be awarded by the commission based on the medical evidence.
(b) Compensation for any impairment described in
Subsection (6)(a) shall, as closely as possible, be proportionate to the specific losses in the schedule set forth in
this section.

(c) Permanent partial disability compensation may
not:
(i) exceed 312 weeks, which shall be considered the
period of compensation for permanent total loss of
bodily function; and
("> be paid for any permanent impairment that
existed prior to an industrial accident.
(7) T h e
amounts specified in this section are all subject to
^he limitations as to the maximum weekly amount payable as
specified in this section, and in no event shall more than a
maximum of 66-%7r of the state average weekly wage at the
t me
*
° f t n e injury for a total of 312 weeks in compensation be
required to be paid.
.2^i3.

1997

P e r m a n e n t total disability — A m o u n t of
p a y m e n t s — Rehabilitation.
(D ( a ) In cases of permanent total disability resulting from
a n industrial accident or occupational disease, the emp l o y e e s h a l l r e c e i v e compensation as outlined in this
section.
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disabili t v compensation, the employee has the burden of proof to
show by a preponderance of evidence that:
(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment or combination of impairments as a result of the
industrial accident or occupational disease that gives
rise to the permanent total disability entitlement;
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled;
and
(iii) the industrial accident or occupational disease
was the direct cause of the employees permanent
total disability.
(c) To find an employee permanently totally disabled,
the commission shall conclude that:
(*) the employee is not gainfully employed;
(ii) the employee has an impairment or combination
of impairments that limit the employee's ability
to do basic w o r k
activities;
^ u ) the industrial or occupationally caused impairment or combination of impairments prevent the
employee from performing the essential functions of
the work
activities for which the employee has been
qualified until the time of the industrial accident or
occupational disease that is the basis for the employee s
' I m m a n e n t total disability claim; and
(lv t h e
'
**?}»*" cannot perform other work reasonablv available, takingb into consideration the em,
, '
,
,.
ployees age. education, past± work experience, medica
l capacity, and residual functional capacity.
, , , ^ • -;
"
1
< x-xi
Tx J- u-v*.
(d) bvidence of ran employee's entitlement to disability
^
benefitg other t h a n thoge ^
under this chapter and
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. if relevant,
m a y b e p r e s e n t e d t o t h e commission, but is not binding
and creates no presumption of an entitlement under this
chapter and Chapter 3. Utah Occupational Disease Act.
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the
i n i t i a l 3 i 2 - w e e k entitlement, compensation shall be 66-VM of
the employees average weekly wage at the time of the injury,
limited as follows:
( a ) compensation per week may not be more than 8 5 *
of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury;
(b) compensation per week may not be less than the
sum of $45 per week, plus $5 for a dependent spouse, plus
$5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up
to a maximum of four dependent minor children, but not
exceeding the maximum established in Subsection (2)(a)
nor exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee at
the time of the injury; and
(c) after the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly
compensation rate under Subsection (2Kb) shall be 369c of
34A
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the current state average weekly wage, rounded to the
nearest dollar.
(3) For claims resulting from an accident or disease arising
out of and in the course of the employee's employment on or
before J u n e 30, 1994:
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for
the initial 312 weeks of permanent total disability compensation except as outlined in Section 34A-2-703 as in
effect on the date of injury.
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be
required to pay compensation for any combination of
disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and
Sections 34A-2-410 through 34A-2-412 and Sections 34A2-501 through 34A-2-507 in excess of the amount of
compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the
applicable permanent total disability compensation rate
under Subsection (2).
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be
reimbursed to the employer or its insurance carrier by the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund and shall be paid out of the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee.
(d) After an employee has received compensation from
the employee's employer, its insurance carrier, or the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of
disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at
the applicable permanent total disability compensation
rate, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall pay all
remaining permanent total disability compensation.
(e) Employers' Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer or its insurance
carrier has satisfied its liability under Subsection (3) or
Section 34A-2-703.
(4) For claims resulting from an accident or disease arising
out of and in the course of the employee's employment on or
after July 1, 1994:
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for
permanent total disability compensation.
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be
required to pay compensation for any combination of
disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and
Sections 34A-2-410 through 34A-2-412 and Sections 34A2-501 through 34A-2-507, in excess of the amount of
compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the
applicable permanent total disability compensation rate
under Subsection (2).
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be
recouped by the employer or its insurance carrier by
reasonably offsetting the overpayment against future
liability paid before or after the initial 312 weeks.
(5) Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Subsection (2), the compensation payable by the employer, its
insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, after
«in employee has received compensation from the employer or
the employer's insurance carrier for any combination of disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the
Applicable total disability compensation rate, shall be reduced,
to the extent allowable by law. by the dollar amount of 50% of
the Social Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the same period.
(6) (a) A finding by the commission of permanent total
disability is not final, unless otherwise agreed to by the
parties, until:
(i) an administrative law judge reviews a summary of reemployment activities undertaken pursuant to Chapter 8, Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act:
lii) the employer or its insurance carrier submits
to the administrative law judge a reemployment plan
as prepared by a qualified rehabilitation provider
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reasonably designed to return the employee to gainful employment or the employer or its insurance
carrier provides the administrative law judge notice
that the employer or its insurance carrier will not
submit a plan; and
(iii) the administrative law judge, after notice to
the parties, holds a hearing, unless otherwise stipulated, to consider evidence regarding rehabilitation
and to review any reemployment plan submitted by
the employer or its insurance carrier under Subsection (6)(a)(ii).
(b) Prior to the finding becoming final, the administrative law judge shall order:
(i) the initiation of permanent total disability compensation payments to provide for the employee's
subsistence; and
(ii) the payment of any undisputed disability or
medical benefits due the employee.
(c) The employer or its insurance carrier shall be given
credit for any disability payments made under Subsection
(6Mb) against its ultimate disability compensation liability under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational
Disease Act.
(d) An employer or its insurance carrier may not be
ordered to submit a reemployment plan. If the employer
or its insurance carrier voluntarily submits a plan, the
plan is subject to Subsections (6)(d)(i) through (iii).
(i) The plan may include retraining, education,
medical and disability compensation benefits, job
placement services, or incentives calculated to facilitate reemployment funded by the employer or its
insurance carrier.
(ii) The plan shall include payment of reasonable
disability compensation to provide for the employee's
subsistence during the rehabilitation process.
(iii) The employer or its insurance carrier shall
diligently pursue the reemployment plan. The employer's or insurance carrier's failure to diligently
pursue the reemployment plan shall be cause for the
administrative law judge on the administrative law
judge's own motion to make a final decision of permanent total disability.
(e) If a preponderance of the evidence shows that
successful rehabilitation is not possible, the administrative law judge shall order that the employee be paid
weekly permanent total disability compensation benefits.
(7) (a) The period of benefits commences on the date the
employee became permanently totally disabled, as determined by a final order of the commission based on the
facts and evidence, and ends:
(i) with the death of the employee; or
lii) when the employee is capable of returning to
regular, steady work.
(b) An employer or its insurance carrier may provide or
locate for a permanently totally disabled employee reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time work in a job
earning at least minimum wage provided that employment may not be required to the extent that it would
disqualify the employee from Social Security disability
benefits.
(c) An employee shall fully cooperate in the placement
and employment process and accept the reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time work.
id) In a consecutive four-week period when an employee's gross income from the work provided under Subsection 17Kb) exceeds $500, the employer or insurance carrier
may reduce the employee's permanent total disability
compensation by 507c of the employee's income in excess
of $500.
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(e) If a work opportunity is not provided by the employer or its insurance carrier, a permanently totally
disabled employee may obtain medically appropriate,
part-time work subject to the offset provisions contained
in Subsection (7)(d).
(f) (i) The commission shall establish rules regarding
the part-time work and offset.
(ii) The adjudication of disputes arising under
Subsection (7) is governed by Part 8, Adjudication.
(g) The employer or its insurance carrier shall have the
burden of proof to show that medically appropriate parttime work is available.
(h) The administrative law judge may:
(i) excuse an employee from participation in any job
that would require the employee to undertake work
exceeding the employee's medical capacity and residual
functional capacity or for good cause: or
(ii) allow the employer or its insurance carrier to reduce permanent total disability benefits as provided in
Subsection (7)ld) when reasonable, medically appropriate,
part-time employment has been offered but the employee
has failed to fully cooperate.
(8) When an employee has been rehabilitated or the employee's rehabilitation is possible but the employee has some
loss of bodily function, the award shall be for permanent
partial disability.
(9) As determined by an administrative law judge, an
employee is not entitled to disability compensation, unless the
smployee fully cooperates with any evaluation or reemployment plan under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational
Disease Act. The administrative law judge shall dismiss
without prejudice the claim for benefits of an employee if the
idministrative law judge finds that the employee fails to fully
cooperate, unless the administrative law judge states specific
indings on the record justifying dismissal with prejudice.
(10) (a) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use
of both hands, both arms, both feet, both legs, both eyes,
or any combination of two such body members constitutes
total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to this section.
(b) A finding of permanent total disability pursuant to
Subsection (lOXa) is final.
(11) (a) An insurer or self-insured employer may periodically reexamine a permanent total disability claim, except
those based on Subsection (10), for which the insurer or
self-insured employer had or has payment responsibility
to determine whether the worker remains permanently
totally disabled.
(b) Reexamination may be conducted no more than
once every three years after an award is final, unless good
cause is shown by the employer or its insurance carrier to
allow more frequent reexaminations.
(c) The reexamination may include:
(i) the review of medical records;
(ii) employee submission to reasonable medical
evaluations;
(iii) employee submission to reasonable rehabilitation evaluations and retraining efforts;
(iv) employee disclosure of Federal Income Tax
Returns;
(v) employee certification of compliance with Section 34A-2-110; and
(vi) employee completion of sworn affidavits or
questionnaires approved by the division.
(d) The insurer or self-insured employer shall pay for
the cost of a reexamination with appropriate employee
reimbursement pursuant to rule for reasonable travel
allowance and per diem as well as reasonable expert
witness fees incurred by the employee in supporting the
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employee's claim for permanent total disability benefits at
the time of reexamination.
(e) If an employee fails to fully cooperate in the reasonable reexamination of a permanent total disability finding, an administrative law judge may order the suspension of the employee's permanent total disability benefits
until the employee cooperates with the reexamination.
(f) (i) Should the reexamination of a permanent total
disability finding reveal evidence that reasonably
raises the issue of an employee's continued entitlement to permanent total disability compensation
benefits, an insurer or self-insured employer may
petition the Division of Adjudication for a rehearing
on that issue. The petition shall be accompanied by
documentation supporting the insurer's or self-insured employer's belief that the employee is no longer
permanently totally disabled.
(ii) If the petition under Subsection (HKfKi) demonstrates good cause, as determined by the Division
of Adjudication, an administrative law judge shall
adjudicate the issue at a hearing.
(iii) Evidence of an employee's participation in
medically appropriate, part-time work may not be the
sole basis for termination of an employee's permanent
total disability entitlement, but the evidence of the
employee's participation in medically appropriate,
part-time work under Subsection (7) may be considered in the reexamination or hearing with other
evidence relating to the employee's status and condition.
(g) In accordance writh Section 34A-1-309. the administrative law judge may award reasonable attorneys fees
to an attorney retained by an employee to represent the
employee's interests with respect to reexamination of the
permanent total disability finding, except if the employee
does not prevail, the attorneys fees shall be set at $1,000.
The attorneys fees shall be paid by the employer or its
insurance carrier in addition to the permanent total
disability compensation benefits due.
(h) During the period of reexamination or adjudication
if the employee fully cooperates, each insurer, self-insured
employer, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall continue to pay the permanent total disability compensation
benefits due the employee.
(12) If any provision of this section, or the application of any
provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the
remainder of this section shall be given effect without the
invalid provision or application.
1997
34A-2-414. Benefits in c a s e of d e a t h — Distribution of
award to d e p e n d e n t s — D e a t h of d e p e n d e n t s
— Remarriage of s u r v i v i n g s p o u s e .
(1) (a) The benefits in case of death shall be paid to one or
more of the dependents of the decedent for the benefit of
all the dependents, as may be determined by an administrative lawT judge.
(b) The administrative law judge may apportion the
benefits among the dependents in the manner that the
administrative law judge considers j u s t and equitable.
(c) Payment to a dependent subsequent in right may be
made, if the administrative law judge considers it proper,
and shall operate to discharge all other claims.
(2) The dependents, or persons to whom benefits are paid,
shall apply the same to the use of the several beneficiaries
thereof in compliance with the finding and direction of the
administrative law judge.
(3) In all cases of death when:
(a) the dependents are a surviving spouse and one or
more minor children, it shall be sufficient for the surviving spouse to make application to the Division of Adjudi-

